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ABSTRACT Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed
considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination,
Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated for-
mally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to
these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases can-
not arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that
figures in Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation.
I. Gettier Cases, Excusability, and Justification
Why, according to Williamson, do Gettier cases matter? For most of us, they
matter because they show that the gap between knowing p and being justi-
fied in believing p is greater than what one might otherwise have thought.
What Gettier cases show is that one’s justified belief that p can fail to be
knowledge that p for reasons other than that p is false. This realization has
led epistemologists to think of knowledge in new and sometimes surprising
ways. Williamson takes a different view of the relation between knowledge
and justification. For Williamson, a belief is genuinely justified only if it is
knowledge. He notes that on such a view, Gettier cases cannot arise. But if
this is true, then the answer to the question posed in the title of Gettier’s
1963 paper, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ should have been a clear
‘yes!’. Of course, Gettier posed the question rhetorically. His paper seems to
show convincingly that knowledge is not justified true belief. And epistemol-
ogy’s subsequent preoccupation with the search for a fourth condition for
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16 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
knowledge presupposed that Gettier had it right. But if Williamson is right
about justification, Gettier did not show that those who thought knowledge
is justified true belief were wrong about the nature of knowledge. Rather, if
Williamson is right, those who think that he did show this are confused, and
badly so, about the nature of justification. Many people now think the project
of trying to solve the Gettier problem was misguided, but few think it was
that misguided!
Some may think that we have overstated Williamson’s position. What he
says is that ‘in a strongly externalist sense a belief is fully justified only if it
constitutes knowledge’.1 While the Gettier problem cannot arise for strongly
externalist justification, Williamson allows that it does arise for an ‘inter-
nalist’ sense of justification. But this does not entirely absolve epistemology
of the aforementioned confusion. For what Williamson calls ‘internalist jus-
tification’ is a degenerate form of justification—‘closer to excusability than
genuine justification’. Excusability and justification are very different notions.
One’s !-ing is justified just in case one’s !-ing meets the relevant normative
standard. One’s !-ing is excusable only if one’s !-ing fails to meet the nor-
mative standard, but in a blameless manner. So if Williamson is right, Gettier
cases are not genuine cases of justified true belief. Rather they are cases of
excusable true belief.
Actually, if Williamson is right, the confusion runs deeper. This emerges
when we consider what it takes, onWilliamson’s view, to be excused for having
a belief that falls short of knowledge:
. . . the victim of a paradigmatic sceptical scenario is not to be blamed
for forming false beliefs under the misapprehension that they constitute
knowledge. The subject has a cast-iron excuse for having formed those
beliefs.2
Presumably, a subject in a Gettier case has the same excuse for forming a
belief that fails to constitute knowledge, namely he formed it under the mis-
apprehension that it does constitute knowledge. So the subject in the Gettier
case has an excusable true belief, which amounts to having a justified true
belief in the internalist sense. Thus, if Gettier’s question is interpreted as
pertaining to internalist justification, it does not have a trivial affirmative
answer. On this internalist interpretation, epistemologists were not confus-
edly denying the trivial truth that (strongly external) justified true belief is
(sufficient for) knowledge. Unfortunately, on this internalist interpretation,
Gettier’s question has a trivial negative answer. That one can have a true belief
1The first emphasis is ours, the second Williamson’s. We come back to that second emphasis
below.
2Williamson, ‘On Being Justified’. Williamson cites this paper when discussing the kind of
justification at issue in Gettier cases.
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Williamson on Gettier Cases & Epistemic Logic 17
while misapprehending that one knows is hardly controversial. Most, if not
all, cases of true belief are cases in which the subject believes he knows. We do
not need fancy Gettier cases to demonstrate that, in some of these cases, the
subject fails to know.
So, for Williamson, one can be justified in either a strongly externalist sense
or in an internalist sense. In either sense, the Gettier problem is based on
a serious confusion. Williamson says that ‘it would be reassuring to have
some independent way of checking that in Gettier cases the subject does not
know after all’. But if it is worth reassuring ourselves that Gettier cases can
indeed arise, then there must be a notion of justification distinct from either
Williamson’s strong externalist sense (according to which, trivially, they can-
not arise), or his internalist sense (according to which, uncontroversially, they
can). For this reason, even Williamson should be dissatisfied with the options
he has given us for understanding justification. We think there is a middle
ground—a notion of genuine justification that can make sense of the Gettier
problem.
Williamson illustrates his two notions of justification using an analogy with
moral justification. He considers the case of
a competent and non-negligent surgeon who causes the death of a
patient because a lab technician with a grievance switched the labels on
two bottles: he has a cast-iron excuse for killing the patient, but it does
not amount to a justification for killing the patient.
The surgeon was not morally justified in administering the lethal medica-
tion, but his action was excusable.
What was the excuse? Williamson says that in the skeptical scenario, the
excuse is that the subject believed under the misapprehension that his belief
was knowledge. Presumably, by analogy, the excuse for the surgeon was his
misapprehension that, by administering the medicine, he was doing the right
thing. So, forWilliamson, when onemeets the normative standard—knowing,
in the epistemic case, and doing the right thing, in the moral case—one is
genuinely justified. When one fails to meet the standard but does so under
the misapprehension that one does meet the standard, one is to be excused.
The former notion corresponds to Williamson’s notion of strongly externalist
justification and the latter to his notion of internalist justification.
But when one fails to meet a normative standard, is one’s failure excusable
merely because one misapprehends that one meets the standard? Suppose the
surgeon is under the misapprehension that he is doing the right thing because
he carelessly assumes that the bottle closest to him contains the right med-
ication. He administers the lethal medication thereby failing to do the right
thing. Surely he is not to be excused for this failure even though he did it
under the misapprehension that he was doing the right thing.
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18 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
Why is the action of the surgeon who administered the lethal medication
because of the switched labels excusable, but the action of the surgeon who
blithely assumed he was grabbing the correct bottle not excusable? The answer
is straightforward. The first surgeon, unlike the second, is to be excused
because his misapprehension that he was doing the right thing, unlike the
misapprehension of the second surgeon, was rational. Although his action did
not meet the normative standard, he rationally believed it did. Equivalently,
we can say that his belief that he was doing the right thing met the relevant
standards for rationality. And, just as when one’s !-ing meets the relevant
standards of morality, one’s !-ing is morally justified, so too when one’s
!-ing meets the relevant standards of rationality, one’s !-ing is rationally
justified. So in the misleading evidence case, unlike in the case of careless
assumption, the surgeon’s excuse for violating the moral standard is that he
was rationally justified in believing that he met the standard.
To complete the analogy, we can see that the epistemic case has the same
structure as the practical case. Having an excusable belief that does not consti-
tute knowledge does not amount to believing under the misapprehension that
one knows. Just as one can inexcusably misapprehend that one is doing the
right thing (as in the case of the careless surgeon), so one can inexcusably mis-
apprehend that one knows. If the Ouija board tells me it will rain and I trust
its deliverances, I will inexcusably believe it will rain. My misapprehension
that I know it will rain does not absolve me.
Rational justification is not strong externalist justification. The surgeon’s
belief that he was doing the right thing did not constitute knowledge, nor did
my belief that I know that it will rain.
Excusably !-ing, then, requires more than !-ing under the mis-
apprehension that one’s !-ing meets the relevant normative standard.
Misapprehensions themselves are subject to excusability constraints. When
one’s misapprehension is rational, one’s failure to meet the standard is
excusable.
Rationally believing one meets a standard is sufficient to excuse one’s fail-
ure to meet it, but it is not necessary. Had the second surgeon’s careless
behavior resulted from a minor stroke, his administering the lethal medica-
tion would have been excusable despite his lacking any rational justification
for thinking he was doing the right thing. Similarly, in an epistemic case,
one may be so emotionally distraught after hearing bad news that one fails
to appreciate properly one’s evidence. In such a case one might excusably
believe that one knows without being rationally justified in believing one
knows.
While rational justification is distinct from excusability, we have seen that
the notion of rational justification is indispensable for explaining why some
subjects can be excused for failing to meet a normative standard. The sur-
geon with the misleading evidence is to be excused for administering the
lethal medication because he was rationally justified in believing he was doing
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Williamson on Gettier Cases & Epistemic Logic 19
the right thing. The subject in a standard Gettier case is to be excused for
having a belief that falls short of knowledge because he is rationally justified
in believing he knows.
Rational justification is weaker than strong externalist justification but
stronger than Williamson’s internalist justification. Subjects in a Gettier case
are rationally justified in believing they know p, and so trivially, rationally
justified in believing p. Viewing the subjects in Gettier cases as rationally
justified allows Gettier’s question to have a non-trivial answer. The subject
in a Gettier case is not justified in a sense that guarantees he knows. Nor does
a Gettier subject merely truly believe under a misapprehension that he knows.
Nor does a Gettier subject merely truly believe under the excusable misappre-
hension that his belief constitutes knowledge. A subject in a Gettier case has
a rationally justified true belief. His failure to know is excusable because he is
rationally justified in believing he knows.3
What is the relation between rationally justified belief and strongly exter-
nalist justified belief? Are they distinct kinds of justification? Williamson says
that ‘a belief is fully justified only if it constitutes knowledge’. As justification
is a scalar notion, this way of talking suggests that to be justified in a strong
externalist sense is to be maximally justified. It would follow that to be ratio-
nally justified is to be situated at some less than maximal point on the scale.
On this picture, the distinction between rational and strong external justifica-
tion is one of degree rather than kind. Were this true, we could not say that in
a Gettier case the subject has a fully justified true belief. We could say at most
that the subject has a partially justified true belief.
This is an implausible consequence. It entails that one cannot have a fully
rational false belief. But falsity is not a failure of rationality. Rationality
requires one to conform one’s beliefs to one’s evidence. When one’s evidence
is misleading, rationality will require one to adopt a false belief. This is pre-
cisely the situation of the subject in the bad case. If he is not fully rational,
then he is, to a certain degree, irrational. But it is hard to see how the subject
in the bad case could be convicted of irrationality.
Could we say that the subject in the bad case is irrational—but excusably
so? As we have seen, the explanation for why the subject in the bad case is
excusable presupposes the rationality of his belief (that he knows). Perhaps
Williamson could say that unless the subject’s belief is fully rational he is not
fully excusable. But since the view we are considering requires knowledge for
full rationality, it would follow that the subject in the bad case is not fully
3Perhaps one can be rationally justified in believing p without being rationally justified in believ-
ing one knows p. For example, perhaps one can rationally believe that one will lose the lottery
(on the basis of the odds alone) even though one cannot rationally believe that one knows one
will lose the lottery. Whether such a case is possible depends on subtle issues about the nature
of outright belief that go beyond the scope of this paper. If such cases are possible, then it’s not
clear there is a knowledge norm for belief.
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20 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
rational and so partly to blame for believing falsely. On what basis could such
a subject be blamed?
Is there another way to understand Williamson’s claim that strong
externalist justification is full justification? Perhaps he intends strong
externalist justification to be a distinct kind of justification, normatively
superior to other kinds. Consider his description of the good and bad cases:
the victim of a paradigmatic sceptical scenario is not to be blamed
for forming false beliefs under the misapprehension that they consti-
tute knowledge. The subject has a cast-iron excuse for having formed
those beliefs. But the subject in the corresponding non-sceptical sce-
nario whose beliefs constitute knowledge needs no excuse for having
formed those beliefs; there is nothing to excuse. That the two sub-
jects are equally blameless does not imply that there is no normative
difference between them. The subject who blamelessly forms false beliefs
has not done as well as the subject who gains knowledge.4
Williamson’s point is that being (genuinely) justified amounts to more than
mere blamelessness. Each subject is blameless. But the subject in the good
case does not need to be excused, presumably because his beliefs meet the rel-
evant standard for strong externalist justification, namely knowledge.We have
seen that this description of the cases misses an important normative element.
In addition to both subjects blamelessly believing, each subject has a ratio-
nal belief that, in the bad case, explains the blamelessness of the subject. But
according toWilliamson, the subject in the bad case, because he fails to know,
has not done as well as the subject in the good case. As Williamson puts it,
‘excusable failure is not normatively equivalent to success’.5
There is much dispute about what counts as normative, and so what counts
as a normative difference. Insofar as what Williamson says is correct, there
is no reason to suppose that all normative differences are differences in jus-
tification. Suppose you shoot and kill a terrorist about to blow up a school.
I shoot at a terrorist about to blow up a school but miss. I did my best, so we
are equally blameless. Is there a normative difference between us? Although
I blamelessly missed the terrorist, I did not do as well as you. You succeeded
while I failed—blamelessly. Presumably, we were each justified in trying to
kill the terrorist. Were you better justified because you did better? That seems
wrong. Whatever normative differences there are between us because you did
better than I, you were no better justified in shooting at the terrorist than I
was. If you were fully justified, so was I.
4Williamson, ‘On Being Justified’, 116.
5Ibid, 117.
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Williamson on Gettier Cases & Epistemic Logic 21
Just as we each aimed at the terrorist, according to a familiar metaphor
belief aims at truth. According to Williamson, a better metaphor is that belief
aims at knowledge. As he says, ‘Mere believing is a case of botched knowing.’6
In effect, when one believes p, one tries to know p. When one fails, one merely
believes p. Suppose both you and I believe p and you succeed in knowing
p, but I blamelessly fail because I was rationally justified in believing (that
I know) p. Williamson would say that, while I may be in some sense justified
in believing p, only you are fully justified. You have done better than I.
But here the analogy with the case of shooting at the terrorist is telling.
We noted that you were no better justified in trying to kill the terrorist than
I was, even though you succeeded but I did not. By analogy, you are no bet-
ter justified than I in trying to know p, i.e., believing p, simply because you
succeeded and I did not. Whatever normative differences there are between
success and failure, it is not in the justification for trying. We see no reason
to think that Williamson’s strongly externalist justification is full justification
in a way that rational justification is not. So we see no reason not to say that
when one is rationally justified, as in a Gettier case, one can be fully justified.
At this point, it is worth asking what Williamson’s notion of strong exter-
nalist justification comes to. Are there two different notions of genuine
justification—rational justification and strongly externalist justification?
Perhaps, but once we are clear about rational justification, it is unclear what
Williamson is referring to by ‘strongly externalist justification’. This is tech-
nical vocabulary that he does not define. If all we know is that a belief is
justified in a strongly externalist sense if and only if it is knowledge, then for
all we know, to say a belief is justified in a strongly externalist sense is entirely
redundant, just another way of saying that the belief constitutes knowledge.
In our epistemological theorizing, we include both rational justification and
knowledge. Have we left something out if we do not include strongly exter-
nalist justification? This is hard to say until we know what it is. Justification is
relative to a domain of normativity, e.g., rational justification, moral justifica-
tion, prudential justification. Strong externalist justification is distinct from
each of these. So what is the relevant normative domain for strong exter-
nalist justification? Perhaps by ‘strong externalist justification’ Williamson
means ‘epistemic justification’. But ‘epistemic’ is another technical expression
whose meaning in this context would be quite unclear. Distinguishing strong
externalist justification from rational justification by classifying the former
as epistemic would yield the surprising result that rationally justified belief is
not an epistemic notion.7 So Williamson would have to be using ‘epistemic’
in a non-standard way.8 What it would mean is hard to know. Allowing that
6Ibid, 47.
7Of course rational belief must be distinguished from rational action which is not an epistemic
notion.
8For more on the problems associated with the use of ‘epistemic’, see Cohen (forthcoming).
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22 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
both rational and strong externalist justification are epistemic would not be
progress. It would leave us unable to answer our original query—how to
distinguish strong externalist justification from rational justification.
A final option would be for Williamson to hold that ‘strongly external-
ist justification’ refers to a constitutive norm for belief, on the model of his
knowledge norm for assertion. This would mean that it is in the nature of
belief that the norm applies. As he notes in his discussion of the constitutive
norm of assertion ‘believing p stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the
outer’.9 So perhaps just as the norm of assertion is constitutive, so is the norm
of belief.10 Nonetheless, it remains true that the subjects in a Gettier case are
rationally justified. The fact that subjects in these cases fail to be constitutively
justified does nothing to undermine our characterization of them as genuinely
justified true beliefs.
We see no reason to modify our view that Gettier cases illustrate how
knowledge and justification differ in substantial, and often surprising ways.
We thus think that it is indeed interesting that the existence of Gettier
cases can be motivated formally—although we remain puzzled as to why
Williamson finds it interesting.We disagree, however, about the choice of logic
on Williamson’s part.
II. Margins for Error and the Iterativity of Knowledge
In his paper, Williamson shows that the existence of Gettier cases can be
motivated formally, for cases of justified true belief that do not amount
to knowledge arise in models for epistemic logic where both knowledge
and justified belief are represented. Williamson’s models, however, have
some uncomfortable consequences. We show that stronger logics than those
adopted by Williamson also exhibit the existence of Gettier cases without
having those consequences.
In epistemic logics, that a proposition p is known at a world w is modeled
by the fact that, in all words accessible from w, p is true. For Williamson,
the logic of knowledge is T. The accessibility relation for T is reflexive, which
results in the claim that knowledge is factive. Other candidates to be consid-
ered are S4 and S5. In S4, the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive,
which in addition to factivity yields also the iterativity of knowledge. In S5,
the accessibility relation is symmetric in addition to reflexive and transitive,
which yields the claim that, if in scenario A for all the agent knows she is in
scenario B, then in scenario B for all the agent knows she is in A. We agree
with Williamson that S5 is not the right logic for knowledge. For all they
9Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits.
10One problem with this way of viewing matters is that Williamson views constitutive norms
as applying to game-like phenomena, where these are contrasted with natural phenomena. But
while assertion may be game-like, surely belief is a natural phenomenon.
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Williamson on Gettier Cases & Epistemic Logic 23
know, brains in vats are normal human beings; however, it is not true that
for all we know we are brains in vats. The epistemic possibility relation is not
symmetric. But what about S4? Might epistemic possibility be transitive?
Before trying to answer that question, let us take a closer look at the model
that Williamson uses to illustrate the existence of Gettier cases. In this model,
the worlds are ordered pairs of temperatures and appearances of tempera-
tures, where both of these are real numbers. Thus, if in w it is 70 degrees and
it appears to be 70 degrees, then w = <70, 70>. As usual, a subject knows
a proposition p in a world w if and only if p is true in all the worlds accessi-
ble from w. Williamson then characterizes the accessibility relation R for this
model as follows:
<e, f>R<e∗, f ∗> if and only if f = f ∗ and |e∗ − f ∗| ≤ |e− f | + c
So, w∗ is accessible from w if and only if w∗ has the same appearance as w and
the absolute value of the difference between appearance and reality in w∗ does
not exceed the absolute value of the difference between appearance and reality
in w by more than the factor c. Let us suppose that the value of c is 5. In that
case, if it is 70 degrees but it appears to be 71, then for all the agent knows it is
as warm as 77 and as cold as 65 degrees; if it is 70 degrees and it also appears
to be 70 degrees, then for all the agent knows it is as warm as 75 and as cold
as 65; and if it is 71 and appears to be 70, then for all the agent knows it is
as warm as 76 and as cold as 64. R so defined is reflexive, non-transitive and
non-symmetric. To model beliefs, Williamson adds that, in any world<e, f>,
the subject believes all and only those propositions that she knows in a world
where appearances and reality match, <f , f>. Williamson claims that the
subject thus has only justified beliefs (at least in what he calls the ‘internalist’
sense of justification, though not in any epistemologically interesting sense, a
distinction which we have challenged).
Let us now return to our question: Could the epistemic accessibility relation
be transitive? Isn’t the obvious answer ‘no’? Haven’t we learned that knowl-
edge does not iterate? There are reasons for thinking that knowledge does
not iterate that can be easily accounted for. We can assume, for instance, that
the subjects that we are interested in possess the concept of knowledge. More
serious reasons for doubting the iterativity of knowledge have been given by
Williamson himself. He argues that the iterativity of knowledge conflicts with
plausible margin for error principles.11 Let us assume that we cannot dis-
criminate differences in temperature smaller than 5 degrees. How best can
we capture this discriminatory failure? Williamson would say that we should
capture it as follows:
11Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, Ch. 5.
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24 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
MFE(W): If the temperature is n, then the strongest proposition that we
can know is that the temperature is between n − c and n + c.
Notice that MFE(W) does not say that if the temperature is n then the
strongest proposition that we will know is that the temperature is between
n − c and n + c. In a radical deception scenario where the temperature is
30 degrees but it appears to be 70 degrees, the strongest proposition that we
know in Williamson’s model is that the temperature is between 30 + c and
110 + c. Rather, we know that the temperature is between n − 5 and n + 5 in
the best case scenario, where appearances and reality match exactly.
If we know MFE(W) (as we do in Williamson’s model), then knowledge
cannot iterate. For suppose that we do know MFE(W) and that knowledge
iterates. Let us further suppose that the temperature both is and appears
to be 70 degrees. In that case, by MFE(W) we know that the temperature
is not 64 degrees. By the iterativity of knowledge, we know that we know
that the temperature is not 64 degrees. Now, we also know (thanks to our
knowledge of MFE(W)) the following: that if the temperature is 69, then the
strongest proposition we may know is that it is between 64 and 74 degrees.
Contraposing, we know that if we know that the temperature is not 64, then
the temperature is not 69. We know a conditional and its antecedent. Without
committing ourselves to any strong version of closure (although in the mod-
els that Williamson and we consider such a version of closure does hold), we
can conclude that, in at least these kinds of cases, we know its consequent: we
know that the temperature is not 69. But that is wrong according toMFE(W):
when the temperature is 70 degrees (as we are assuming it is), for all we know
it is as cold as 65.
That is an interesting argument for choosing T over S4 as the logic for
knowledge. We will argue, however, that there are other ways of capturing the
margins for error claim which are at least as compelling as MFE(W), and that
they do not conflict with the iterativity of knowledge. Insofar as that conflict
motivates choosing T over S4, we should reconsider that choice.
But before making that argument we want to point out that there are addi-
tional reasons to reconsider the choice of T over S4 as the logic for knowledge.
First, Williamson is committed to our having knowledge of certain Moorean-
looking propositions. The original Moorean propositions are of the form ‘p
and I do not believe p’.12 Now, in Williamson’s model, the strongest propo-
sition that we know at a possible world is one that we do not know that
we know. As we said above, moreover, Williamson’s subjects believe all and
only those propositions they know at a world where their actual appearances
match reality. Thus, where ‘p’ is the strongest proposition known at a world,
the subject will know a proposition of the following form: ‘p and I do not
12This is the so-called ‘omissive’ version of Moorean propositions—the ‘comissive’ Moorean
propositions are of the form ‘p and I believe not-p’.
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Williamson on Gettier Cases & Epistemic Logic 25
believe I know p’. This is not quite a Moorean proposition, but it is close
enough to qualify as Moorish, and may be uncomfortable for some philoso-
phers. For instance, it is something that would be quite strange to assert, and
yet it can be asserted if we follow Williamson in thinking that knowledge
is the norm of assertion. In Williamson’s models,13 that proposition can be
upgraded to ‘p and I’m almost certain that I do not know p’, which is even
more uncomfortable.14
There is also a second noteworthy consequence of taking T to be the logic
of knowledge. As Williamson himself notes, in his models there are two kinds
of Gettier cases: those that closely resemble the cases originally presented
by Gettier himself, and those that more closely resemble ‘fake-barn’ style
of Gettier cases. Thus, for instance, when the temperature is 60 degrees but
appears to be 70, the subject falsely (but justifiably) believes that the temper-
ature is between 65 and 75. Because his beliefs are closed under entailment,
she also believes that either it is between 65 and 75 or it is 60. This latter is
a justified true belief which does not amount to knowledge (for all the agent
knows, it is below 65 or above 75), and follows closely one of the original
Gettier cases. Suppose now that the temperature is 65 degrees but appears to
be 70. As before, the subject (justifiably) believes that it is between 65 and 75.
However, this is not something the subject knows: given MFE(W), for all she
knows it is 60. This is a case of justified true belief that does not amount to
knowledge where the belief in question is not derived from any false belief
(indeed, in this case the subject has no false beliefs at all). Many philosophers
who accept the existence of Gettier cases because they are convinced by the
original cases, however, are not so convinced by fake-barn style of cases.15
This is another reason to take a second look at the choice of T over S4 and
MFE(W).
Let us take a closer look at Williamson’s models. Notice, in particular, two
features that they have. First, the margin for error always grows with the dis-
tance between appearance and reality (this is constraint [#2] in Williamson’s
paper). In other words, if the difference between appearance and reality is
greater in w than in w∗, then more is known in w∗ than in w. Second, this
margin for error grows symmetrically: as the real temperature drops while the
apparent temperature keeps the same, for instance, more and more warmer
worlds become accessible (this follows from Williamson’s characterization of
the accessibility relation for his model). We disagree with both features. Take
the second one first. Why would the margin for error grow symmetrically?
Why would it be the case that the warmer it gets the colder I know it is?
Fortunately, this feature of Williamson’s models does not play any essential
role in the results that Williamson proves, and so he could easily get rid of it.
13Williamson, ‘Improbable Knowing’, ‘Very Improbable Knowing’.
14The ‘Moorish’ terminology comes from Williams and Hajek, ‘“p, and I”’.
15See, for instance, Gendler and Hawthorne, ‘Real Guide to Fake Barns’.
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26 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
The first feature, however, is central to those results, for it entails the non-
transitivity of the accessibility relation. But that feature is not as natural as
Williamson would have us think. More natural is to start with the assump-
tion that our evidence does not allow us to discriminate perfectly: when it
appears to be 70 degrees, for all we know it could be between 65 and 75,
say. Williamson will agree with us so far. But then he would add that when
it appears to be 70 and it is, say, 69, then for all we know it is colder than
65. Why would this be the case? We already made allowances for the fact that
when it appears to be 70 degrees,then for all we know it is 69. If it really is 69,
then that is just one of the cases that we would expect to occur when it appears
to be 70. Notice too that the case in which the temperature appears to be n
and it is, say, n + 5, is a quasi-skeptical case: our evidence is almost mislead-
ing. Those cases are extremely improbable. But if they are indeed actual, then
the consequence is as it should be: we do know that it is at most 75 degrees
when it appears to be 70 and it is 75. That is just a consequence of the fact
that our margin for error is 5 degrees either way.16
Suppose that I go outside and it feels like 70 degrees. You are inside getting
dressed up, and you ask me how cold it is. I reply that it feels like 70 to me,
and so it is at least 65. You then acquire a thermometer and come to know
that it is actually 69 degrees. If Williamson is right, I did not really know that
it was at least 65 degrees—and so there is something wrong with my telling
you that it could not be as cold as 64. In our judgment, both of these are
counterintuitive consequences ofWilliamson’s way of thinking about margins
for error. However, it is noteworthy that the same feature of Williamson’s
models responsible for this consequence (to wit, the intransitivity of R) plays
a role in their yielding Gettier cases of the fake-barn variety. Those who think
that fake barn cases are genuine Gettier cases, then, may have a reason to
adopt Williamson’s conception of margins for error. Having no such clear
intuition ourselves, we think it worthwhile to consider the consequences of
adopting an alternative conception of margins for error.
Our disagreement with Williamson comes down to this: if the distance
between appearances and reality increases but the real temperature is still
within our discriminatory range, thenWilliamson thinks we know less and we
think we know the same. Now, if the temperature falls outside of the range,
then we agree that we now know less than when it falls inside—although we
think that the range of accessible worlds should grow asymmetrically in the
direction of the real temperature. Those considerations motivate the following
characterization of the accessibility relation:
<e, f>R<e∗, f ∗> if and only if f = f ∗ and either (i) e<f − c
and e ≤ e∗ ≤ f ∗ + c; or (ii) e>f + c and f ∗ − c ≤ e∗ ≤ e; or
(iii) f − c ≤ e∗f + c
16For an argument along these lines, see Stalnaker, ‘On Hawthorne and Magridor’.
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Williamson on Gettier Cases & Epistemic Logic 27
That is to say, a world w∗ is accessible from a world w if and only if appear-
ances are the same in w and w∗ and the temperature in w∗ is anywhere between
the temperature in w and the appearance, or anywhere at most c degrees away
from the appearance. So, when e is within f − c and f + c, the strongest propo-
sition known is that the temperature is within that range; when e is below
f − c, the strongest proposition known is that it is between e and f + c; and
when e is above + c, the strongest proposition known is that it is between
f − c and e.
So characterized, R is obviously reflexive. It is also non-symmetric: if the
temperature appears to be 70 degrees but it is 30, then for all I know it is
(say) between 65 and 75; but if the temperature both is and appears to be
70, then I know that it is not 30. But what makes the constraint different
from Williamson’s is that R is transitive. Consider the set R(<e, f>), which
contains all and only the worlds accessible from <e, f>. It is easy to verify
that every world accessible from any member of R(<e, f>) is a subset of
R(<e, f>) itself, which means that R is transitive.
Given that R so characterized is transitive, it follows that MFE(W) can-
not be satisfied in our models: for instance, if the temperature appears to be
70 degrees and is 65, then I know that it is at least 65, violating MFE(W)
(assuming that c = 5). But this does not mean that we cannot capture a mar-
gins for error principle within our models. Notice that MFE(W) takes our
discriminatory capacities to be limited by the real temperature: when the tem-
perature is n, we can at best know that it is between n − c and n + c (the
best case being that where it also appears to be n). By contrast, we propose
that our discriminatory capacities are determined instead by our appearances:
when it appears to be n, we can at best know that it is between n− c and n+ c
(the best case being that where the temperature also is between n − c and
n + c). Thus, we propose the following formulation of a margins for error
principle:
MFE: If the temperature appears to be n, then the strongest proposition
that we may know is that the temperature is between n − c and n + c.
Knowledge of MFE doesn’t conflict with the iterativity of knowledge.
Suppose that we do know MFE and that knowledge iterates. Let us also sup-
pose that the temperature both is and appears to be 70 degrees. In that case,
by MFE we know that the temperature is at least 65 degrees (assuming again
that c = 5). By the iterativity of knowledge, we know that we know that the
temperature is at least 65 degrees. But this time the conditional that we know
(thanks to our knowledge of MFE) is innocuous: if we know that we know
that the temperature is at least 65, then the temperature does not appear to
be 71. We know, therefore, that the temperature does not appear to be 71, but
that does not conflict with anything else we know.
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28 Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña
In our models, then, knowledge iterates without conflicting with a plausible
rendition of a margins for error principle. Moreover, our models do not have
either of the uncomfortable consequences that Williamson’s does. Given the
iterativity of knowledge, if I know that p I know that I know it, and so our
model does not have the consequence that I can know pwithout believing that
I know it. For the same reason, everything that is known in a world w is also
known in any world accessible from w, and so our models do not exhibit the
fake-barn style of Gettier cases.
Recall the traditional Gettier case that arises in Williamson’s model: if the
temperature is, say, 30 degrees but it appears to be 70, then the subject has a
justified true belief that it is either between 65 and 75 or it is 30, which does
not amount to knowledge, because for all the agent knows it is between 30 and
65 (and also above 75 or below 30). Therefore, the subject has a justified true
belief that does not amount to knowledge. The same case arises in our models:
when the temperature is 30 degrees but it appears to be 70, the subject has a
justified true belief that it is either between 65 and 75 or it is 30, but, for all
the subject knows, it is between 30 and 65 (though in our models it is not true
that for all the subject knows it is above 75 or below 30).
In summary, the existence of Gettier cases can be motivated formally by
assuming that the logic of knowledge is S4 as well as T. Moreover, if we
assume that the logic of knowledge is S4 then we can avoid Moorish propo-
sitions and fake-barn style Gettier cases, while at the same time doing justice
to the existence of margins for error for knowledge.
III. Conclusion
Against Williamson, we have argued that the kind of justification at issue in
Gettier cases cannot be identified with excusable or blameless belief. We have
also argued that the iterativity of knowledge is not in conflict with plausi-
ble renditions of a margins for error principle, and that taking S4 to be the
logic of knowledge allows us to see how the existence of Gettier cases can be
motivated without having to commit ourselves to some of the uncomfortable
consequences of taking T to be that logic.
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